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| author | Dennis Fink | 2026-10-29 18:57:32 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dennis Fink | 2026-10-29 18:57:32 +0100 |
| commit | aa59080c78a815a7c2e4509c9a8fe73edc93f6c2 (patch) | |
| tree | 500802f1d421a5418f978a60f28401be93b9f830 /webmentions_ssg/url_security.py | |
| parent | 8fb010e7ae781e94eefe20fe713a98905b031a8f (diff) | |
| download | webmentions-ssg-aa59080c78a815a7c2e4509c9a8fe73edc93f6c2.tar.gz webmentions-ssg-aa59080c78a815a7c2e4509c9a8fe73edc93f6c2.zip | |
fix(core): prevent unsafe login redirects
Validate post-login redirect targets as local paths and reject
backslashes, scheme-relative URLs, and malformed paths that browsers may
interpret as external destinations.
Add regression coverage for safe local redirects and open redirect
variants.
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | webmentions_ssg/url_security.py | 20 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/webmentions_ssg/url_security.py b/webmentions_ssg/url_security.py index a963635..ade64d6 100644 --- a/webmentions_ssg/url_security.py +++ b/webmentions_ssg/url_security.py @@ -56,3 +56,23 @@ def is_http_url(url: str) -> bool: return False return parsed.scheme.lower() in {"http", "https"} and parsed.hostname is not None + + +def is_safe_next_url(next_url: str) -> bool: + """Allow redirects only to paths on this site.""" + # Check the original string too: urlsplit("///evil.example").path is + # "/evil.example", even though browsers can treat the original as external. + if "\\" in next_url or not next_url.startswith("/") or next_url.startswith("//"): + return False + + try: + target = urlsplit(next_url) + except ValueError: + return False + + return ( + not target.scheme + and not target.netloc + and target.path.startswith("/") + and not target.path.startswith("//") + ) |
